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Abstract 
This paper examines the ex-post performance of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) that obtained small 
business credit scoring (SBCS) loans by using a unique Japanese firm-bank matched dataset. The ex-post 
probability of default after the SBCS loan was provided significantly increased for SMEs that obtained an 
SBCS loan from a transactional lender. Also, the lending attitude of relationship lenders during the recent 
global financial crisis was more severe if a transactional lender had extended an SBCS loan to a firm. These 
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1. Introduction 
Loans to small businesses have traditionally been based on intimate relationships between borrower firms and 
lenders, because many of these firms are much more informationally opaque than large firms and thus lenders 
primarily rely on “soft” information gathered through long-lasting transaction relationships with small 
businesses. However, advances in information technology over the past decades have considerably transformed 
the landscape of small business lending, and a number of transaction-based lending technologies that rely on 
quantifiable and verifiable “hard” information have become available for small businesses. In particular, small 
business credit scoring (SBCS) has expanded rapidly in many countries and has attracted a fair amount of 
research interest.
1
 It has been argued that SBCS is effective in increasing the availability of credit to small 
businesses (Agarwal and Hauswald, 2008; Berger et al., 2011; Berger et al., 2005a; Frame et al., 2004; Frame 
et al., 2001) and/or improving the accuracy of risk-based pricing of loans to them (Berger et al., 2005a). 
However, the recent contraction in small business lending in the United States, where the use of SBCS is the 
most advanced, has cast some doubts on the predictive power of SBCS.
2
 The recent global financial crisis has 
also raised concerns that, in cases where relationship lending plays an important role, transactional loans such 
as SBCS loans may have adverse effects on the provision of credit by relationship lenders during the crisis.  
                                                        
1
 See Berger and Frame (2007) for a survey. 
2
 See, for instance, “When Business Credit Scores Get Murky,” Wall Street Journal, March 18, 2010. Mester 
(1997) cautioned the accuracy of SBCS models needed to be assessed based on their performance during an 
economic downturn. 
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Against this background, the present paper, focusing on Japan, examines how firms that received 
SBCS loans have weathered the financial crisis that erupted after the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 
2008. In particular, the paper examines whether the ex-post performance of firms that received an SBCS loan 
before the crisis depends on the bank’s strategies of implementing SBCS. Previous studies suggest that there 
are two potential benefits for a lender to adopt SBCS: cost-saving in the screening of loan applications, and the 
mitigation of informational opacity of prospective borrowers (Berger and Frame, 2007). We develop this 
argument and hypothesize that transactional lenders tend to use SBCS based on the cost-saving motive, 
whereas the motive of relationship lenders in adopting SBCS is to make more efficient lending decisions. We 
argue that the differentiated use of SBCS by relationship lenders and transactional lenders would affect firms’ 
ex-post performance as well as the relationship lenders’ willingness to provide rescue finance when firms face 
difficulties during crisis. 
The analysis in this paper relies on a unique firm-bank matched dataset on SBCS in Japan. Our 
dataset is based mainly on firm surveys conducted by the Research Institute of Economy, Trade, and Industry 
(RIETI) during 2008-2009. The virtue of these surveys is that we can identify SBCS loan user firms and 
non-user firms as well as firms’ primary bank, that is, the bank that has the largest amount of loans outstanding 
to a particular firm. Moreover, we can identify whether a primary bank (relationship lender) or a non-primary 
bank (transactional lender) has extended SBCS loans to a particular firm. Thus, we can make inferences on 
how a bank’s strategy of implementing SBCS differs depending on whether the bank is a relationship lender or 
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a transactional lender. 
Focusing on the period of financial turmoil after the failure of Lehman Brothers, we perform two 
exercises and find the followings. First, we examine how the provision of SBCS loans, either by a primary 
bank or a non-primary bank, affected borrowing firms’ performance during the crisis. Existing studies find 
mixed evidence on whether SBCS loans may be associated with more type II errors (approving loans that will 
default) than relationship loans (see, for example, Agarwal and Hauswald (2008) and DeYoung et al. (2008) 
that find positive result, and Berger et al. (2011b) that find no effects). We conjecture that if a transactional 
lender uses SBCS for cost-saving, then it is likely that SBCS loans have a higher PD than non-SBCS loans, 
because credit scores are based on a limited set of quantifiable information and thus the scores alone are 
imperfect indicators of borrower quality. In contrast, if a relationship lender uses SBCS discretionally in order 
to evaluate the creditworthiness of opaque small businesses more accurately, then it is likely that SBCS loans 
are associated with a lower likelihood of default. 
Consistent with the first part of the above hypothesis, we find that, on average, the ex-post PD of 
firms that have obtained SBCS loans from non-primary banks is higher than that of non-SBCS loan user firms, 
conditional on the ex-ante PD and other covariates. In contrast, we find that the ex-post PD of firms that have 
obtained an SBCS loan from their primary bank becomes smaller than that of non-SBCS loan user firms. 
Second, we investigate whether the use of transactional loans such as SBCS loans adversely affected 
a relationship lender’s incentive to provide assistance to its client-firms during the financial crisis. In particular, 
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we examine whether the lending attitude of a primary bank worsened more in the midst of the crisis if a firm 
obtained SBCS loans. We conjecture that the provision of SBCS loans is detrimental to a firm-bank 
relationship if it is provided by a transactional lender for the following reasons. First, a higher indebtedness of 
a borrowing firm as a result of loans from another lender will exacerbate its moral hazard incentives and 
reduces the relationship lender’s willingness to provide credit (Degryse et al., 2012). Second, standard theory 
of adverse selection argues that, in the presence of informational asymmetry, a low quality firm would tend to 
self-select to banks that are more prone to type II errors in anticipation of being mistaken for a high quality 
borrower (Ergungor and Moulton, 2011; Gropp et al., 2012). This suggests that a low quality firm chooses to 
obtain SBCS loans from transactional lenders that adopt SBCS for the cost-saving motive. But then, the 
relationship lender would infer that the firm’s credit prospect has worsened and would reduce its credit supply 
in the midst of crisis. On the other hand, we predict that such negative spillover effects will not appear if an 
SBCS loan has been extended by a relationship lender itself.  
Consistent with the first part of the second hypothesis above, we find that the lending attitude of a 
firm’s primary bank worsened during the financial crisis if the firm had obtained an SBCS loan from a 
non-primary bank. In contrast, when SBCS loans were provided by the primary bank itself, we do not find 
such detrimental effects of SBCS loans on primary banks’ lending attitude. 
Overall, our findings suggest that the main motive of extending SBCS loans for a transactional 
lender is to expand the customer base via the cost-saving effect generated by SBCS. The cost associated with 
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this strategy of implementing SBCS is that these loans are more prone to type II errors and that it induces 
borrower adverse selection problems. For a relationship lender, the virtue of SBCS is that it improves the 
accuracy of lending decisions in that the credit score represents one of many inputs. From borrowers’ 
viewpoint, SBCS loans from transactional lenders appear to be beneficial in that – at least in normal times – 
they increase the availability of credit. However, such loans may also have their drawbacks in that the use of 
SBCS loans from transactional lenders may be detrimental to the close ties borrowers have with their 
relationship lender, which may be particularly crucial for small businesses during times of crisis.  
Our contributions to the literature on SBCS are as follows. First, despite its growing relevance in 
small business loan markets, there is little empirical research on SBCS in countries other than the U.S. We fill 
this gap by utilizing a unique firm-bank matched dataset in Japan.  
Second, our analyses show that relationship and transactional lenders have different motives in 
extending SBCS loans. While understanding this point is important, it has not been explored much in the 
literature. This is due to the data limitations previous empirical studies faced, namely that they were based on 
bank-level datasets and thus were not able to distinguish whether banks extending SBCS loans are a 
relationship lender for the particular firms to which they extend such loans.
3
 It should also be noted that this 
                                                        
3
 Most studies are based on a survey of the largest U.S. banks conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Atlanta in January 1998. On the other hand, Bergeret al. (2011b) recently used a survey of U.S. community 
banks conducted by the U.S. Small Business Administration. 
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paper is closely related to Berger et al. (2005a), which find that the primary motive of “rules” banks that use 
SBCS to automatically make lending decisions is cost-saving, while “discretion” banks that utilize credit 
scores as one of several inputs in making credit decisions aim to reduce the opaqueness of potential borrowers. 
While our findings are consistent with the use of SBCS by “rules” banks vs. “discretion” banks by Bergeret al. 
(2005), the key contribution of this paper to the literature is that it sheds light on the reasons why banks adopt a 
particular strategy in implementing SBCS. 
Third, this paper empirically examines, for the first time to our knowledge, how the role of a 
relationship lender as a provider of liquidity insurance during financial crises is affected by the use of SBCS, 
and finds that SBCS loans by transactional lenders have negative externalities. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the development of 
the SBCS loan market in Japan. Section 3 then develops our empirical hypotheses on how the use of SBCS 
loans affects the ex-post performance of borrower firms and the lending attitude of their relationship lenders 
during times of crisis. Next, Section 4 describes the data and variables used in the paper and explains our 
empirical models, while Section 5 presents the results of our empirical analysis. Section 6 summarizes the 
paper’s findings. 
 
2. The Development of Small Business Credit Scoring in Japan 
Credit scoring is a quantitative method to evaluate the credit risk (PD) of loan applications. Using both 
 9 
qualitative and quantitative data and statistical techniques, credit scoring produces a “score” for a loan 
applicant that forms the basis of credit decisions such as whether or not to provide a loan and the loan contract 
terms. Following Berger and Udell (2006), we define SBCS loans as loans where the primary lending decision 
is based on numerical credit scores. Note that this definition does not rule out the use of other information (for 
instance, soft information that is primarily used in relationship lending) as a secondary source.
4
  
In the United States, credit scoring has been used for underwriting consumer credit for some time, 
but it was not used for small business credit until the mid-1990s because of the heterogeneity of small 
businesses. The development of credit scoring models for small business loans in the 1990s was motivated by 
the casual observation that repayments of small business loans depended less on the business itself than on the 
credit history of the business owner (Mester, 1997; Allen et al., 2004). Since then, many U.S. banks have been 
using the consumer credit score of small business owners to evaluate small business loan applications (Cowan 
and Cowan, 2006). 
SBCS has been rising in popularity among Japanese banks as well since the early 2000s. Although 
there is no official aggregate data on the volume of SBCS loans in Japan, the outstanding amount of SBCS 
loans for the three largest banks was 5 trillion yen (about 50 billion dollars) at the end of 2005, about 5 percent 
                                                        
4
 Whether SBCS is a substitute or complement to other lending technologies is one of the key issues in the 
literature (Berger et al., 2005a) that will be discussed below. Uchida et al. (2008b) investigate the relationship 
among different lending technologies in Japan. However, they do not include SBCS in their analysis. 
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of their entire loans outstanding to small businesses.
5
 SBCS has also spread among regional banks and 
cooperative financial institutions, who originated more than 8 trillion yen of SBCS loans in total during 
FY2003 – FY2006.
6
 Many scoring models adopted by Japanese banks use only firms’ attributes such as 
financial ratios and do not take into account most, or any, of the business owners’ personal attributes, because 
banks do not have sufficient access to databases on the personal credit histories of business owners
7
 (Ono, 
2006). In essence, SBCS loans by Japanese banks are based on business credit scores.  
The expansion of SBCS among regional banks and cooperative financial institutions in the early 
2000s was partly due to regulatory pressure from the Financial Services Agency (FSA) to provide small 
business loans that did not require small business borrowers to pledge real estate collateral.
8
 However, growth 
in the SBCS loan market has stagnated since the mid-2000s, in part because the default rates of SBCS loans 
                                                        
5
 Nikkei Newspaper, September 20, 2006. 
6
 Financial Services Agency (FSA), “Progress Report on the Action Program Concerning Enhancement of 
Relationship Banking Functions,” July 12, 2007. 
7
 Note, however, that Japanese banks usually collect information of the business owners’ personal attributes 
manually when extending non-scoring loans including relationship-based loans. 
8
 In March 2003, the FSA released the “Action Program Concerning Enhancement of Relationship Banking 
Functions.” The action program urged regional banks and cooperative financial institutions to “utilize methods 
such as the credit scoring model […] from the perspective of promoting lending activities, placing emphasis on 
cash flow from business operations and avoiding an excessive reliance on collateral and personal guarantees” 
(p.4, authors’ translation). 
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have been higher than expected.
9
 This suggests that the predictive power of SBCS models based on business 
credit scores is relatively weak. Worried by the fact that some banks were accumulating non-performing loans, 
the FSA has ceased to promote the use of SBCS in its Action Program since 2007. Thus, we can infer that 
during the period of SBCS loan extension that we focus on – before the onset of the global financial crisis that 
erupted after the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, but after the FSA had stopped actively 
promoting the use of SBCS – there was little regulatory pressure to extend SBCS loans, so that the decision 
whether or not to extend such loans at most banks was based on economic motives. This situation provides us 
with a good opportunity to examine the empirical hypotheses described below.  
 
3. Empirical Hypotheses 
To examine how the use of SBCS affects the performance of loans to small businesses and their ties with 
relationship lenders in times of crisis, we put forward empirical hypotheses that are based on the existing 
theoretical and empirical literature. 
 
3.1. Strategies of Implementing SBCS 
                                                        
9
 A typical example is the failure of Shin Ginko Tokyo. The bank was established in 2004 at the initiative of 
the Tokyo metropolitan government, but by the end of 2007 the bank had lost nearly 80 percent of its capital 
because of the extremely high default rate on its SBCS loans. See Hasumi and Hirata (2010) for details. 
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 There may be several reasons for lenders to adopt SBCS, and the strategies of implementing SBCS 
(and the associated effects on loan contract terms and ex-post loan performance) may differ across banks. 
Previous studies suggest that there are two potential benefits for lenders of adopting SBCS: (i) cost-saving in 
screening loan applications, which would help to expand small business lending, and (ii) the mitigation of the 
borrower-opacity problem, which would contribute to more efficient lending decisions and/or setting contract 
terms more accurately (Mester, 1997; Berger et al., 2005a; Berger and Frame, 2007). Berger and Frame (2007) 
argue that cost-saving is likely to be the key motive for “rules” banks that use scores to automatically approve 
or reject loan applications, as this greatly reduces the human resource expenses associated with loan processing. 
In contrast, banks that use scores as a supplementary factor in making credit decisions are termed as 
“discretion” banks. For discretion banks, the key incentive for adopting SBCS is to improve the precision of 
their information about the creditworthiness of prospective borrowers and make correct lending decisions. 
 
3.2. The Effect of SBCS on Borrower Performance 
Regarding the effect of SBCS on loan performance, DeYoung et al. (2008) point out three potential 
effects on a bank’s risk taking and loan performance. First, SBCS may make the loan production process more 
efficient and reduce associated costs. As a result, the bank will be more willing to extend loans to marginally 
riskier borrowers (risk-taking effect), because, with increased efficiency, the bank has greater capacity to 
absorb losses. This effect would increase the ex-post default rate, all else equal. Second, if used in isolation, 
 13 
SBCS may be informationally inferior to traditional relationship lending, as credit scores – because they are 
based on a limited set of quantifiable information – are an imperfect indicator of the creditworthiness of 
prospective borrowers. This effect of SBCS makes both type I errors (rejecting good loans) and type II errors 
(approving loans that will default) more frequent and will result in a higher default rate.
10
 This being the case, 
lenders will use SBCS only if the cost-saving effect of credit scoring outweighs the deterioration in expected 
loan performance. In contrast, and finally, by combining the hard information obtained from the credit scoring 
model and the soft information gathered through an existing firm-bank relationship and the traditional loan 
screening process, SBCS may improve the lender’s information set and result in a smaller default rate. The 
first and second effects correspond to the cost-saving motive underlying the adoption of SBCS, while the third 
effect is likely to be found for banks that use SBCS to reduce the borrower opacity problem. 
The performance of SBCS loans would be affected not only by banks’ lending strategies but also by 
borrowers’ self-selection. A standard theory of adverse selection suggests that, in the presence of informational 
asymmetry, a low quality borrower will apply to uninformed lender in anticipation of being mistaken for a high 
quality borrower (type II error). Thus, it is likely that a low quality borrower will select a bank that uses SBCS 
for cost-saving, while a high quality borrower will select a bank that uses SBCS for the reduction of 
borrower-opacity problem (Shaffer, 1998). Consistent with the reasoning, empirical studies by Ergungor and 
Moulton (2011) and Gropp et al. (2012) find that a creditworthy borrower will choose to apply credits to 
                                                        
10
 For the sake of brevity, we will only refer to type II errors hereafter. 
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relationship banks or local banks that are deemed to have accumulated the borrower’s soft information. 
Turning to empirics, previous studies find mixed evidence on the association between SBCS loans 
and ex-post loan performance.
11
 Using U.S. SBA loans data, DeYoung et al. (2008) report that the default rate 
for SBCS loans is higher than that for non-scoring loans. Agarwal and Hauswald (2008) also find that the 
credit delinquency of online scoring loans is higher than that of relationship-based in-person loans. On the 
other hand, Berger et al. (2011b) report that the use of SBCS does not materially affect the non-performing 
loan ratio of U.S. community banks.  
 We posit below that relationship lenders and transactional lenders have different motives for 
adopting SBCS, and the differentiated use of SBCS by these lenders will result in contrasting ex-post 
performance of SBCS-loan user firms. 
On extending an SBCS loan to a prospective borrower, a transactional lender does not have sufficient 
access to soft information on the borrower. Thus, the likely motive for employing SBCS for a transactional 
lender is cost-saving. On the other hand, employing SBCS solely based on the cost-saving motive is likely to 
exacerbate the borrower opacity problem, resulting in more frequent type II errors. A deterioration in the 
performance of loans after the adoption of SBCS may also occur as a by-product of more ex-ante risk-taking if 
                                                        
11
 Regarding the ex-ante riskiness of borrowers, Berger et al. (2005a) find that the average risk rating of loans 
issued by “rules” banks is higher (i.e., such loans are riskier) than that by non-scoring banks, while the average 
risk rating of loans issued by “discretion” banks is lower than that by non-scoring banks. Thus, the empirical 
results by Berger et al. (2005a) suggest that the risk-taking effect of SBCS is limited to “rules” banks. 
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SBCS is useful for a transactional lender in reducing loan origination costs, and/or as a by-product of adverse 
self-selection by low quality borrowers. It should also be noted that SBCS loans by Japanese banks are mostly 
based on business credit scores, and thus they may be more prone to type II errors than those based on 
consumer credit scores. 
In contrast, using the credit score as a complement to the soft information that has been accumulated, 
a relationship lender may be able to evaluate the creditworthiness of small businesses more accurately. If that 
is the case, the default rate of SBCS loans provided by a relationship lender should be smaller than that of 
non-scoring loans.
12
 In addition, a high quality borrower with positive soft information is more likely to 
self-select to its relationship bank. 
 In summary, we put forward the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1 (The effect of SBCS on borrower performance) 
The average ex-post performance of SBCS loan user firms deteriorates more than that of non-scoring loan 
user firms if SBCS loans are extended by a transactional lender that implements SBCS for the cost-saving 
motive. 
                                                        
12
 Another potential benefit of SBCS for a relationship lender is the creation of uniform and objective loan 
underwriting criteria across borrowers (Mester, 1997). That is, SBCS is likely to mitigate uneven credit 
decisions by loan officers, which are inherent in traditional relationship lending. 
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In contrast, the average ex-post performance of SBCS loan user firms improves more than that of non-scoring 
loan user firms if SBCS loans are provided by a relationship lender that adopts SBCS in order to more 
accurately evaluate the creditworthiness of prospective borrowers. 
 
 Note that cost-saving may be the main motive also for a relationship lender if it is relatively costly 
for the lender to reproduce (update) soft information. In this case, SBCS loans by a relationship lender are 
qualitatively the same as those by a transactional lender, and we would expect the average performance of 
SBCS-loan borrowers to deteriorate more than that of non-scoring loan borrowers. 
 
3.3. The Effect of SBCS on Liquidity Provision by a Relationship Lender in Times of Crisis 
 Previous studies on relationship lending suggest that firms, especially small firms that are 
informationally opaque, tend to suffer from credit rationing during financial crises, but that firms that have a 
close relationship with a relationship lender are less likely to be affected by such crises than other similar firms 
(see, for instance, Section 4.3.2.7 of Degryse et al. (2009) and references therein). The reason is that 
relationship lenders can provide a kind of implicit liquidity insurance in situations where borrowing firms 
experience a temporary adverse shock, as the proprietary information accumulated through intimate 
relationships produces rents that allow lenders to offset temporary losses (Boot, 2000). The empirical literature 
on main banks (relationship lenders) in Japan in particular suggests that main banks tend to play a critical role 
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when their client firms fall into distress (Aoki, 1994; Hoshi et al., 1990; Kang and Shivdasani, 1995; Sheard, 
1989; 1994; Suzuki and Wright, 1985).
13
 However, empirical evidence that relationship lenders provide 
liquidity in times of financial distress is not limited to Japan but has also been found for other countries such as 
Germany (Elsas and Krahnen, 1998), Korea (Ferri et al., 2001; Jiangli et al., 2008), Italy (De Mitri et al., 2010), 
and the United States for the 19th-century (Bodenhorn, 2003). 
What has not been explored in the literature is how the use of transactional lending such as SBCS 
affects relationship lenders’ incentives to provide liquidity insurance during financial crisis. We hypothesize 
that the effect of SBCS on the liquidity provision by a relationship lender also depends on whether the bank 
that extends an SBCS loan is the relationship lender itself or another, transactional lender. 
On the one hand, if a small business borrower obtains an SBCS loan from a transactional lender, this 
is likely to lower a relationship lender’s willingness to lend during a period of crisis for the following two 
reasons. First, a higher total indebtedness by obtaining SBCS loans from a transactional lender reduces the 
borrower’s incentive to repay the debt as well as the relationship lender’s willingness to provide credit.
14
 For 
instance, Degryse et al. (2012) find that a creditor reduces its credit supply when a borrower obtains loans from 
another creditor. The argument is further supported by empirical studies on Japanese main banks that show that 
                                                        
13
 In this context, a number of empirical studies suggest that main banks charge their borrowers higher interest 
margins to compensate for the provision of liquidity insurance. See, for instance, Kawai et al. (1996), Nemoto 
et al. (2011), Osano and Tsutsui (1985), and Weinstein and Yafeh (1998). 
14
 Note, however, that this argument applies not only to SBCS loans but also to any type of loans. 
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distressed firms with a smaller dependence on their main bank in their total debt outstanding are less likely to 
receive rescue finances and other assistance from the main bank, resulting in a higher probability that such 
firms go bankrupt (Suzuki and Wright, 1985) and lower sales and investment afterwards (Hoshi et al., 1990). 
Second, we argued in the previous subsection that a low quality firm would apply to SBCS loans provided by 
transactional lenders that are more prone to type II errors. Then, the relationship lender of the firm would infer 
that the creditworthiness of the firm has worsened, and becomes less willing to provide rescue finance 
afterwards. 
On the other hand, SBCS loans obtained from a relationship lender do not create such negative 
externalities and therefore are likely to leave the provision of liquidity by a relationship lender during financial 
crisis unaffected. Moreover, if a relationship lender uses the numerical credit score as one of many inputs in 
making a credit decision, then it is likely that the relationship lender will be better informed about the 
borrowing firm than when not using credit scores. In this case, the use of SBCS will reduce the informational 
opacity problem with regard to borrowing firms and strengthen the incentive for a relationship lender to 
provide credit to client firms in distress. 
In summary, we put forward the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2 (The effect of SBCS on liquidity provision by a relationship lender in times of crisis) 
A relationship lender is less willing to provide liquidity insurance during a period of crisis to client firms that 
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have obtained SBCS loans from other, transactional lenders than to firms that have not obtained SBCS loans. 
In contrast, a relationship lender is more willing to provide liquidity insurance during a period of crisis to 
client firms that have obtained SBCS loans from the same relationship lender than to firms that have not 
obtained SBCS loans from it. 
 
Note that the latter part of Hypothesis 2 again rests on the assumption that a relationship lender 
adopts SBCS in order to reduce the information opacity of a borrower firm. If, on the other hand, the lender 
uses SBCS as a substitute for relationship lending, it will lose, at least partially, soft information that is needed 
to evaluate the creditworthiness of the firm in times of distress, and effectively becomes a transactional lender. 
Under this scenario, the positive effect of SBCS on liquidity provision by a relationship lender during financial 
crisis is likely to be muted. Another implicit assumption in the latter part of Hypothesis 2 is that firms that need 
financial assistance from a relationship lender face a shortage of liquidity but not a solvency problem. If a firm 
faces a solvency problem, then a more informed relationship lender that utilize SBCS has no incentive to 
provide liquidity to such a firm in permanent distress. 
 
4. Data, Variables, and Empirical Approach 
4.1. Data 
The two main sources of our dataset are the “Survey on Transactions between Enterprises and Financial 
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Institutions under the Financial Crisis” conducted in February 2009 and the “Survey on Transactions between 
Enterprises and Financial Institutions” conducted in February 2008, both by the Research Institute of Economy, 
Trade and Industry (RIETI). Based on a sample drawn from the Financial Information Database of Tokyo 
Shoko Research (TSR), a commercial credit research firm that compiles information on more than 1.2 million 
firms, the 2008 survey questionnaire was sent to 17,018 firms, of which 6,059 responded. The 2009 survey 
questionnaire was sent to 5,979 firms out of the 6,059 respondents to the 2008 survey. The number of 
respondent firms for the 2009 survey is 4,103. 
 These RIETI surveys ask a variety of questions on corporate financing, including, in the 2009 survey, 
whether firms have obtained SBCS loans or not and, if they have, from which financial institutions (for the 
sake of convenience, we call them “banks” hereafter). Banks are categorized as “primary bank,” “second- 
primary bank,” and “other bank.” The primary bank is defined as the bank with the largest amount of loans 
outstanding to the firm, while the second-primary bank is the bank with the second-largest amount of loans 
outstanding to the firm. Firms were asked to identify their primary and second-primary banks both in the 2008 
and the 2009 survey. In addition, we tried to identify other SBCS banks by sending follow-up questionnaires to 
firms that reported using SBCS loans in the 2009 survey (RIETI, “Survey on Small Business Credit Scoring,” 
November 2009).
15
 Thus for each firm, we are able to identify its primary and second-primary banks, and 
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 The questionnaire was sent to 418 firms that responded to the 2009 survey and answered that they had 
obtained SBCS loans. The number of respondent firms to the follow-up survey is 284. 
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whether these banks have extended an SBCS loan. As for the other banks, we are able to identify them only if 
they have extended an SBCS loan to the firm.  
In addition to the information on the usage of SBCS loans, we collect information on firm 
characteristics, primary bank characteristics, and firm-primary bank relationship variables in order to test our 
hypotheses. Firm variables are taken from the RIETI surveys as well as from the TSR Financial Information 
Database, which contains the financial statements of firms surveyed. Firms whose latest financial statements 
are prior to March 2006 are excluded from our sample. In addition, because the focus of the paper is on small 
business credit scoring, we exclude firms whose annual gross sales exceed 5 billion yen. 
Data for primary bank financial variables come from several sources: data for most variables are 
from the Nikkei Financial Quest Database. We then try to supplement missing data from the website of the 
Financial Services Agency (FSA),
16
 which contains information on regional banks and cooperative financial 
institutions, from “Kinyu Map,” which is published annually by Kinyu Journal Company, from the Shinkin 
Bank and Credit Cooperatives (Shinyo Kumiai) database supplied by Keio University, and from banks’ annual 
reports. Because we are primarily concerned with private banks’ usage of SBCS, we drop observations from 
our dataset if a firm has transactions with government-sponsored financial institutions or finance companies 
(non-banks). 
Information for firm-primary bank relationship variables is taken from the 2008 RIETI survey. The 
                                                        
16
 http://www.fsa.go.jp/policy/chusho/shihyou.html.  
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2008 survey asks several questions on the relationship between a firm and its primary bank, including the 
duration of the relationship, the frequency of meeting, the physical distance between the firm and the bank 
branch, and the amount of loans outstanding.
17
 In order to maintain consistency with regard to the identity of 
firms’ primary bank between 2008 (the year for which firm-bank relationship variables are constructed) and 
2009 (the year for which the use of SBCS loans is identified), we drop observations of firms whose primary 
bank changed between 2008 and 2009. 
 Matching the data on the usage of SBCS with firm characteristics, primary bank characteristics, and 
firm-primary bank relationship variables, we have a maximum of 819 observations for the empirical analysis. 
The number of observations differs depending on which dependent variable we use and on the estimation 
strategy that we employ to test our hypotheses below. The reduction in the number of observations from the 
original RIETI surveys (4,103 firms) is due to missing data as well as the exclusion of some firms and 
financial institutions for the reasons explained above.
18
 
 
                                                        
17
 These firm-bank relationship variables are also available for second-primary banks, and we will use this 
information in Table 4 below. 
18
 To be more precise, the number of observation falls from 4,103 to 2,837 by excluding firms whose annual 
gross sales exceed 5 billion yen in order to focus on small businesses. Among these 2,837 firms, the number of 
observation we can obtain information on (i) whether a firm has obtained SBCS loans, (ii) firm characteristics, 
(iii) primary bank characteristics, and (iv) firm-primary bank relationships are 2,002, 2,738, 2,005, and 1,257, 
respectively. The intersection of these four sets of information makes up our sample of 819 observations. 
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4.2. Variables 
A list of variables and their definitions is provided in Table 1, while Table 2 presents summary statistics for all 
sample firms, for firms that have obtained SBCS loans, and for firms that have not obtained any SBCS loans. 
Finally, Table 3 presents summary statistics for firms that have obtained SBCS loans from a primary bank, a 
non-primary bank (a second-primary or other bank), and both primary and non-primary banks.  
In our analysis below, we assume that primary banks act as relationship lenders, while non-primary 
banks act as transactional lenders. First, given that one of the intrinsic features of the main bank system in 
Japan is that firms’ main bank – typically the bank with which a firm has the largest amount of loans 
outstanding – acts as a relationship lender, this assumption is likely to be valid for the large majority of firms. 
Second, apart from whether a bank is a firm’s main bank, several other proxies have been used in the literature 
to identify relationship lenders, such as the duration of a firm-bank lending relationship, the frequency of 
firm-bank meeting, the firm-bank distance, and the share of loans obtained from a bank (Degryse et al., 2009; 
Ono and Uesugi, 2009). Table 4 compares the mean values of these proxies for firm-primary bank and 
firm-non-primary bank pairs in our sample of 819 firms. The results indicate that the intimacy of firm-bank 
relationships measured by these proxies is, on average, stronger for primary banks than for non-primary banks, 
underpinning that our assumption that firms’ main bank acts as a relationship lender is valid.
19
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 In Table 4, firms’ relationship with non-primary banks is measured in terms of the relationship with their 
secondary bank. 
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 The variables of key interest in our empirical analysis are two dummy variables indicating whether a 
firm had SBCS loans outstanding as of February 2009. Specifically, we construct the following dummy 
variables: whether a firm obtained SBCS loans from a primary bank (SC_DUM_PR) and whether it obtained 
SBCS loans from a non-primary bank (SC_DUM_NPR). In the RIETI surveys, SBCS loans are defined as 
“loans that are quickly processed (loan approval/denial is usually decided within a few days) and are easy to 
apply for, that, in general, do not require collateral and/or third-person guarantees, and that are often referred to 
as ‘business loans’ and/or ‘quick loans’” (authors’ translation). The last part reflects the casual observation that, 
in Japan, many banks have specific names for their SBCS loan products, so that firms can judge whether they 
are applying for an SBCS loan. Furthermore, in order to avoid any misclassification, the answer “do not know” 
is allowed in the survey questionnaire. Roughly 20 percent of survey respondent firms selected this choice, and 
these observations are dropped from our dataset. Table 2 indicates that 12.6 percent of firms (103 out of the 
819 firms) in our dataset obtained SBCS loans. Specifically, Table 3 indicates that the ratio of firms that 
obtained an SBCS loan from their primary bank is 7.6 percent (62/819), while that of firms that obtained an 
SBCS loan from a non-primary bank (or banks) is 7.3 percent (60/819). 2.3 percent of sample firms (19/819) 
obtained SBCS loans from both their primary and a non-primary bank. 
 
4.2.1. Variable for Testing Hypothesis 1: Ex-post Performance of Borrower Firms 
As a proxy for ex-post performance to examine Hypothesis 1, we employ the borrower firm’s probability of 
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default in year 2009 (F_PD), that is, the PD of a firm estimated based on its financial statement after the SBCS 
(or non-SBCS) loan was extended.
20
 As a proxy for the observable riskiness of a firm, we employ the 
annualized probability of default within 3 years calculated using the scoring model of Moody’s RiskCalc.
21
 
Table 2 shows that, on average, F_PD is higher for SBCS loan user firms than for non-user firms. In addition, 
Table 3 shows that, among the former, the mean value of F_PD is higher for firms that obtained SBCS loans 
from a non-primary bank (2.8 percent) than for firms that obtained SBCS loans from their primary bank (1.7 
percent).  
 
4.2.2. Variable for Testing Hypothesis 2: Liquidity Provision by a Relationship Lender during the Financial 
Crisis 
To examine Hypothesis 2, we use firms’ answers in the RIETI survey to the question whether the lending 
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 Ideally, we would like to use actual default events as a proxy for the ex-post performance of borrowing 
firms. However, because our ex-post data span only a one-year period, the number of firms in our sample that 
defaulted is very limited (9 out of 826 firms) and thus it is difficult to examine Hypothesis 1 empirically by 
using actual default events.  
21
 RiskCalc v3.2 Japan is created using pooled data on 201,000 SMEs for the period 1992 to 2005. Released in 
2009 by Moody’s KMV, it is one of the most widely used “third-generation” credit scoring models for 
evaluating the creditworthiness of unlisted companies in Japan. RiskCalc employs probit regressions whose 
independent variables are inventory to net sales, trade receivables to net sales, EBITDA to interest expense, net 
sales growth, total liabilities less cash to total assets, retained earnings to total liabilities, cash to total assets, 
gross profit to total assets, previous year income to previous year net sales, and real net sales. 
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attitude of their primary bank improved, remained unchanged, or worsened after the failure of Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008. We use these answers to construct an index variable, R_ATTITUDE (1: improved, 
2: remained unchanged, 3: worsened), that we employ to examine whether relationship lenders were less likely 
to act as providers of liquidity insurance in times of financial distress if a firm had obtained an SBCS loan 
from a transactional lender and whether they became more likely to act in such a manner if the firm had 
obtained an SBCS loan from the relationship lender itself. It should be noted that as a proxy for a relationship 
lender’s willingness to lend during the financial crisis, R_ATTITUDE is superior to the actual amount of credit 
supplied because the latter is contaminated by loan demand factors.
22
 
Tables 2 and 3 show that the mean value of R_ATTITUDE is 2.27 for firms that have obtained SBCS 
loans from non-primary banks, 2.11 for firms that have obtained SBCS loans from primary banks, and 2.02 for 
firms that have not obtained SBCS loans. That is, primary banks exhibit the severest lending attitude toward 
firms that have obtained SBCS loans from non-primary banks, on average. 
 
4.2.3. Other Control Variables 
 To control for other covariates that may affect the ex-post performance of a borrowing firm and the 
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 Degryse et al. (2012) in their empirical analysis on loan contracts in Sweden employ a different approach 
and use banks’ internal lending limit for each specific firm as a proxy instead. Banks’ internal lending limits 
indicate the maximum amount that they are willing to lend to a particular firm and therefore represent a proxy 
that is also immune to the effect of loan demand. 
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lending attitude of its primary bank, we include the following variables.  
 First, regarding firm characteristics, we include a firm’s probability of default before SBCS loans are 
extended (PD), because the ex-post probability of default (F_PD) is likely to be positively correlated with the 
ex-ante PD. Consistent with this conjecture, we find that the average probability of default before the SBCS 
loan is extended is higher for firms that obtained SBCS loans than for firms that did not obtain SBCS loans 
(Table 2).  
In addition to PD, we also include the logarithm of annual gross sales (LN_SALES) as a proxy for 
firm size and the logarithm of firm age (LN_FIRMAGE). Further, we control for the share of equity holdings 
by a business representative (OWNERS_HOLD), as such holdings carry the risk of a commingling of a firm’s 
business assets and a representative’s personal assets. 
 Second, to control for the characteristics of a firm’s primary bank, we use the logarithm of the bank’s 
asset size (BK_LN_ASSETS) and the bank’s share of branches within the prefecture of the borrowing firm 
(BK_SHARE). The primary bank’s asset size may be an important determinant of the firm-bank relationship, 
since studies on relationship lending generally find that small banks have a comparative advantage in 
relationship lending (Berger and Black, 2011; Berger et al., 2005b; Uchida et al., 2008a). The market share of 
the bank is included as a covariate to control for the degree of competition in a local loan market. In addition, 
we use the Herfindahl Index in each prefecture (HERFINDAHL). HERFINDAHL is calculated based on the 
share of banks’ branches within the prefecture in which a borrowing firm is located. BK_SHARE and 
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HERFINDAHL may also be important for firm-bank relationships, although the existing empirical literature is 
ambiguous on whether market concentration (competition) is conducive or detrimental to relationship lending 
(Elsas, 2005; Degryse and Ongena, 2007, Presbitero and Zazzaro, 2011).  
Finally, we use a set of variables to measure the strength of the relationship between a firm and its 
primary bank, as this is likely to affect the ex-post performance of a firm as well as the bank’s lending attitude 
in the midst of a crisis. Specifically, we use the logarithm of the duration of the firm-bank relationship 
(R_LN_DURATION), an index variable representing the frequency of meeting (R_FREQ), and an index 
variable for the physical distance between a firm and the primary bank’s branch (R_DISTANCE). We also 
construct a variable that measures the percentage share of the primary bank in a firm’s loans outstanding 
(R_PRIME_SHARE). Table 2 shows that, on average, the intimacy of relationships measured by these proxies 
is stronger for firms that have not obtained SBCS loans than for firms that have obtained SBCS loans. 
 
4.3. Empirical Approach 
4.3.1. Baseline Estimations 
To examine our hypotheses, we begin by estimating the following linear-regression models: 
 iiiii NPRDUMSCPRDUMSCPDF   βX '_____ 210  (1) 
 iiiiij uNPRDUMSCPRDUMSCATTITUDER  γX '_____ 210   (2) 
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where vector 
iX contains the set of covariates for firm i described in Section 4.2.3.  
The dependent variable F_PDi represents the expected default probability of firm i as of year 2009, 
that is, after any SBCS loans were extended. R_ATTITUDEij is an index variable representing the lending 
attitude of firm i’s primary bank j as of February 2009. The two dummy variables for SBCS loans indicate 
whether a firm had SBCS loans outstanding from either its primary bank (SC_DUM_PR) or a non-primary 
bank (SC_DUM_NPR) as of February 2009. Because most SBCS loans to our sample firms were provided 
before February 2009,
23
 F_PDi and R_ATTITUDEij measure the probability of default and the lending attitude 
of a firm’s primary bank after the firm had obtained an SBCS loan or loans. Regarding the other covariates 
iX , 
firm variables are taken from the 2009 RIETI survey and firms’ most recent financial statement, dates for 
which range from March 2006 to December 2008. For bank variables, BK_LN_ASSETS is as of the end of 
March 2008. BK_SHARE and HERFINDAHL are calculated using the “Nihon-Kinyu-Meikan 2008” published 
by Kinyu Journal Company (the data are as of October 2007) and the Keio/Kyoto Joint Global COE Program’s 
Shinkin and Shinso data. Finally, firm-primary bank relationship variables are constructed from the 2008 
RIETI survey, i.e., they are for one year prior to the 2009 survey. In essence, we examine how SBCS loans 
extended by either a primary bank or a non-primary bank affect a user firm’s ex-post performance and the 
lending attitude of the firm’s primary bank, conditional on the firm’s and its primary bank’s ex-ante 
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 For a limited number of firms (221 firms), we can identify the date at which an SBCS loan was provided. 
Only 3 firms out of the 221 answered that they obtained an SBCS loan in February 2009. 
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characteristics and the strength of the firm-primary bank relationship. 
 
4.3.2. Treatment Effects Estimations 
Whether a firm obtains an SBCS loan – be it from its primary bank or a non-primary bank – is not a random 
event. Also, as explained above, borrowers will choose for which banks to apply based on their prospect for 
successfully obtaining credits. Hence, even if we find that the two SBCS loan dummy variables have a 
significant effect on firms’ ex-post performance and their primary bank’s lending attitude in linear-regression 
models, there may be several possible causal interpretations.  
For instance, suppose we obtain a significantly positive coefficient for SC_DUM_NPR in equation 
(1): SBCS loans extended by a firm’s non-primary bank are associated with an increase in the future 
probability of default F_PD, conditional on ex-ante characteristics of the firm (such as its ex-ante riskiness) 
and of the primary bank. One possible explanation for the result would be that SBCS loans by non-primary 
banks are more prone to type II errors and/or the borrower adverse selection when such banks are screening 
loan applications (ex-ante selection effect). However, an alternative possible explanation is that such firms’ 
performance deteriorated as a result of less intensive monitoring by both the non-primary bank that provided 
the SBCS loan and the primary bank (ex-post treatment effect). In a similar vein, the provision of an SBCS 
loan by a non-primary bank may be associated with a tightening of the primary bank’s lending attitude during 
the financial crisis either because the firm-primary bank relationship became less intimate after the firm 
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obtained an SBCS loan from a non-primary bank and the primary bank perceived such a loan to have increased 
the credit risk of the firm (ex-post treatment effect), or because firms that obtain an SBCS loan from a 
non-primary bank had a less intimate relationship with their primary bank in the first place (ex-ante selection 
effect).  
In order to make sharper inferences on the mechanisms underlying the empirical results obtained 
from linear regression models (1) and (2), we need to distinguish the selection effect (selection bias) and the 
treatment effect of SBCS loans. Guo and Fraser (2010) present several models that can consistently estimate 
treatment effects, and we employ propensity score matching. The basic idea of propensity score matching is to 
compare the average performance of firms that have obtained SBCS loans (treatment group) to the average 
performance of treatment firms’ identical “twins” that have not obtained SBCS loans (control group). By 
matching treatment firms to appropriate benchmark firms that have the “closest” propensity scores, we create a 
sample that is akin to the one generated by randomization. The exact procedure of propensity score matching is 
described in the Appendix.  
 
5. Results 
5. 1. Baseline Estimations 
Table 5 presents the ordinary least square regression results of equations (1) and (2). Regarding the effect of 
SBCS on ex-post borrower performance, the coefficient on S_DUM_NPR in the F_PD regression is 
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significantly positive, indicating that the probability of default during the financial crisis increased by as much 
as 0.82 percentage points for borrowers that obtained an SBCS loan from a non-primary bank. This result is 
consistent with the first part of Hypothesis 1, which states that the provision of SBCS loans by transactional 
lenders is associated with a deterioration in borrower ex-post performance, because the transactional lender 
adopts SBCS for the cost-saving motive and thus is more prone to committing type II errors. In contrast, the 
coefficient on S_DUM_PR is significantly negative and indicates that obtaining an SBCS loan from the 
primary bank is associated with a reduction of the probability of default by 0.46 percentage points. The result 
is consistent with the second part of Hypothesis 1, which states that the average ex-post performance of SBCS 
loan user firms improves in comparison with non-scoring loan user firms, since primary banks adopt SBCS in 
order to evaluate the creditworthiness of prospective borrowers more accurately.
24 
 
 Turning to other covariates, the coefficient on PD is positive and significant, indicating that an 
observably riskier borrower ex-ante is likely to be riskier ex-post as well. The coefficient on R_DISTANCE is 
also positive, although only statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The positive coefficient is consistent 
with the finding in previous empirical studies (Agarwal and Hauswald, 2010; DeYoung et al., 2008) that a 
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 As noted in footnote 20, we do not use actual default events as a proxy for ex-post firm performance 
because of the limited number of defaulting firms (9 out of 826 firms). However, the following default rates 
are consistent with the estimation results using F_PD: 0.7 percent (5/722) for non-SBCS loan user firms, 1.6 
percent (1/63) for firms that obtained an SBCS loan from their primary bank, and 5.0 percent (3/60) for firms 
that obtained an SBCS loan from a non-primary bank. 
 33 
borrower that is located farther away from a lender is more likely to default. The coefficient on R_FREQ is 
also weakly positive, suggesting that the average performance of borrowers deteriorates more if their primary 
bank monitors them more frequently. A possible explanation is that firms that turn out to be observably riskier 
ex-post are likely to be informationally opaque ex-ante, and hence primary banks consult with such firms more 
often. 
 Regarding the lending attitude of primary banks during the financial crisis, the coefficient on 
S_DUM_NPR in the R_ATTITUDE regression is significantly positive, indicating that firms that obtained an 
SBCS loan from a non-primary bank prior to the crisis were more likely to experience a tightening in the 
lending attitude of their primary bank during the crisis. In contrast, the coefficient on S_DUM_PR is 
statistically insignificant; that is, SBCS loans provided by the primary bank did not have any positive or 
negative effects on its lending behavior during the crisis period. Taken together, these results are consistent 
with the first part of Hypothesis 2 which states that an SBCS loan by a transactional lender has an adverse 
effect on the provision of liquidity by a firm’s relationship lender during financial crisis, while they are 
inconsistent with the latter part of Hypothesis 2 that an SBCS loan by a relationship lender will strengthen its 
liquidity provision during a crisis. From a borrower’s perspective, the results suggest that there is a certain cost 
associated with switching from a relationship lender to a transactional lender via SBCS loans. Although SBCS 
loans from transactional lenders seem to be beneficial in increasing the availability of credit during normal 
times, they may be detrimental to a firm’s ties with its relationship lender, which may be particularly valuable 
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during times of financing difficulty. On the other hand, SBCS loans from a relationship lender do not have 
such a potentially detrimental effect, but neither do they increase the availability of loans. 
The coefficient on PD is again positive and significant, indicating that the lending attitude of primary 
banks is worse for ex-ante riskier firms. Although significant at only 10 percent, the negative coefficients on 
the relationship variables (R_PRIMESHARE, R_LN_DURATION, R_FREQ) suggest that having established a 
closer relationship with the primary bank has a positive effect on the bank’s lending attitude in times of crisis. 
 
5. 2. Treatment Effects Estimations 
The empirical results in the previous section generally support Hypotheses 1 and 2 posited in Section 3. As 
noted above, however, simple linear regression models allow several causal interpretations.  
 To investigate whether the results obtained in Table 5 are due to the ex-ante selection effect or the 
ex-post treatment effect, we implement propensity score matching estimation. To begin with, Table 6 shows the 
results of the probit estimations for the determinants of whether a firm obtained an SBCS loan from a primary 
(S_DUM_PR) or non-primary bank (S_DUM_NPR).
25
 The results are mostly in line with the findings of the 
previous studies. Starting by looking at LN_SALES and LN_FIRMAGE, we find that the coefficients are 
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 In estimating a firm’s probability of obtaining an SBCS loan from a primary bank (non-primary banks), 
observations for firms that have obtained an SBCS loan only from non-primary banks (a primary bank) are 
dropped from the sample (“control” group in the treatment effect estimation). This is because we want to 
restrict our control observations to firms that have not obtained an SBCS loan from any bank. 
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negative, indicating that smaller and younger firms are more likely to obtain SBCS loans (Frame et al., 2001; 
Cowan and Cowan, 2006), either from a primary bank or a non-primary bank. Next, the positive coefficient on 
PD implies that SBCS loans are more likely to be extended to observably riskier firms. This is consistent with 
the point made by De Young et al. (2008) mentioned in section 3.2 that the adoption of SBCS may lead banks 
to take a more aggressive risk-taking stance. Turning to the firm-primary bank relationship variables, the 
positive coefficient on R_DISTANCE in the primary bank estimation indicates that the primary bank is more 
likely to extend an SBCS loan to a firm that is located farther away from the bank’s branch. One possible 
explanation for this result is that primary banks use SBCS in order to complement soft information on 
borrower firms that are farther away, because soft information on these firms may be less accurate. The 
negative coefficient on R_PRIMESHARE in the non-primary bank estimation suggests that a firm is more 
likely to obtain an SBCS loan from a non-primary bank when it has a less intimate relationship with its 
primary bank as measured in terms of the primary bank’s share in the firm’s loans outstanding.  
Based on the propensity scores obtained from the probit regression models above, we next estimate 
the treatment effect for SBCS loans using kernel matching estimators.
26
 We match each treated observation 
with the non-treated observations, each of which has its own weight that is proportional to the “closeness” to 
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 We also estimate the treatment effects for SBCS loans using other matching algorithms, namely, 5-nearest 
matching and radius matching. The estimation results (not reported) in most cases are qualitatively the same as 
those of the kernel matching estimation and can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
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the treated observation, where “closeness” here is measured by the propensity scores.  
The estimation results for the treatment effect are reported in Table 7. For each variable, there is an 
unmatched estimator and an average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) estimator, both of which are shown 
in the column labeled “Difference.” For example, regarding the treatment effect of SBCS loans by a primary 
bank, in the “Unmatched” row for the variable F_PD, there are two values, one for the treatment group (firms 
that obtained an SBCS loan from a primary bank) and the other for the non-treated group (firms that did not 
obtain an SBCS loan). The former value (1.715) indicates that SBCS loan user firms’ average probability of 
default after the crisis was 1.7 percent, whereas the latter (1.483) indicates that it was 1.5 percent for non-user 
firms. The difference between these two figures, 0.2 percentage points, is the unmatched estimate of the 
treatment effect as shown in the column labeled “Difference.” We should note, however, that the unmatched 
estimate of the treatment effect may well be driven by selection bias since ex-ante differences in terms of firm 
and bank characteristics between SBCS loan users and non-users possibly affect the difference in F_PD. The 
ATT estimator takes into account the sample selection and gives us the treatment effect of SBCS. In the “ATT” 
rows, the value for the non-treated group in the “Unmatched” row is replaced by the value for the control 
group, in which the counterfactual firms are non-SBCS loan users with similar ex-ante characteristics as SBCS 
users. The difference between the value of “Treated” and “Controls” is -0.3 percentage points but is 
statistically insignificant. This suggests that the improvement in the ex-post performance of SBCS loan 
borrowers from primary banks that we found in the previous subsection (Table 5) is driven by the selection 
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effect, that is, a reduction in type II errors due to effective screening by banks and/or self-selection by high 
quality firms.  
Table 7 further indicates that the treatment effect on R_ATTITUDE is also insignificant for firms that 
obtained SBCS loans from a primary bank. 
Turning to the treatment effects of SBCS loans by non-primary banks, Table 7 shows that the 
treatment effects on both F_PD and R_ATTITUDE are positive and significant. The treatment effect on F_PD 
suggests that the ex-post performance of SBCS loan user firms deteriorated more than that of non-user firms, 
presumably because the primary bank exerted less effective monitoring. It may also be the case that the interim 
monitoring by a non-primary bank that had provided an SBCS loan was weak. The treatment effect on 
R_ATTITUDE indicates that the lending attitude of firms’ primary banks during the financial crisis tightened 
after the provision of an SBCS loan by a non-primary bank. This reduced willingness by relationship lenders to 
provide liquidity may be another factor that contributed to the deterioration in the ex-post performance of firms 
that obtained an SBCS loan from a non-primary bank. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper empirically examined the ex-post performance of SMEs that obtained SBCS loans, using a unique 
firm-bank matched dataset for Japan. The paper further examined whether a relationship lender’s willingness 
to provide liquidity to its client firms in times of crisis was negatively affected by the provision of SBCS loans 
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by other banks. Our rich dataset allowed us to investigate whether (and how) the impact of SBCS loans 
differed depending on whether they were extended by a relationship or a transactional lender. The findings of 
the paper can be summarized as follows.  
First, we find that a firm’s ex-post probability of default increased if the firm had obtained an SBCS 
loan from a non-primary bank (transactional lender). The finding is consistent with the hypothesis that a 
transactional lender that adopts SBCS for the cost-saving motive is more prone to type II errors and/or the 
borrower adverse selection problem. Our analysis on the treatment effect of SBCS suggests that weakening 
monitoring activity by banks also played a role. 
In contrast, we find that SBCS loans extended by a primary bank (relationship lender) were 
associated with a decrease in the ex-post default probability of user firms. The finding is consistent with the 
hypothesis that a relationship lender uses SBCS in order to augment the information set in assessing the 
creditworthiness of informationally opaque borrowers. 
Third, we find that the lending attitude of a firm’s primary bank in the midst of the recent financial 
crisis was adversely affected by the use of SBCS loans if these loans were extended by a non-primary bank. 
This suggests that for borrowers the advantage of increased credit availability through SBCS loans from 
transactional lenders in normal times comes at the cost of a reduced willingness of relationship lenders to 
provide liquidity insurance in times of crises. In contrast, we find neither a positive nor a negative effect on 
loan availability in the case of SBCS loans provided by a primary bank, indicating that while the utilization of 
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SBCS by primary banks is useful for a more accurate evaluation of the creditworthiness of potential 
borrower-firms ex-ante, it does not materially affect the provision of liquidity by a relationship lender during a 
crisis. 
As far as we know, this is the first empirical analysis on the different use of SBCS by relationship 
and transactional lenders. Our analysis suggests that SBCS loans by a relationship lender are complementary to 
relationship-based loans and the lender uses the numerical credit score as one of many inputs in making a 
credit decision. In contrast, SBCS loans by transactional lenders seem to be genuinely transaction-based in that 
these lenders adopt SBCS for the cost-saving motive.  
There are various possible extensions to our analyses. One would be to widen the time window for 
observing borrowers’ ex-post performance. Currently, we only have a one-year window for analysis due to data 
limitations. As more data become available over time, we may be able to extend the window to several years 
including non-crisis period, and incorporate additional ex-post performance variables including actual default 
rates. A second extension would be to examine more closely how banks determine their strategy of 
implementing SBCS. In this paper, we did not pay attention to the composition of relationship-based SBCS 
loans and transaction-based SBCS loans within a bank. However, it may well be the case that at one bank, 
SBCS loans are mostly relationship-based, while at another bank, they are mostly transaction-oriented. 
Exploring the determinants of banks’ SBCS strategies further represents an interesting topic for future research. 
Finally, the paper did not analyze the loan contract terms of SBCS loans, such as loan interest rates and 
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collateral. However, our analysis on the different impact of SBCS loans by relationship lenders and by 
transactional lenders suggests that the loan contract terms of SBCS loans may also differ depending on the 
lender. Tackling this issue may reinforce the paper’s findings and further expand our understanding of the 
nature of SBCS loans. 
 
Appendix. Procedure of Propensity Score Matching 
Procedure of propensity score matching is as follows: 
(i) We implement the following probit estimations that model the probability of a firm obtaining an SBCS 
loan from a primary or non-primary bank: 
     )()1__P r ( δ'Xii fPRDUMSC   (3) 
     )()1__P r ( δ'Xii gN P RDUMSC   (4) 
where vector iX contains the same covariates as in equations (1) and (2). Borrower firms that obtained 
an SBCS loan (SC_DUM_PR=1, SC_DUM_NPR=1) are labeled treatment observations. Based on the 
estimation results, we then attach a propensity score to each observation. The propensity score is defined 
as )|1__Pr()( iiiPR PRDUMSCe XX   for equation (3) and as 
)|1__Pr()( iiiNPR NPRDUMSCe XX   for equation (4). 
(ii) Next, for each treatment observation, we identify matched observations from non-treatment observations. 
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We define non-treatment observations as firms that did not obtain an SBCS loan from any bank. That is, 
in matching observations, firms that obtained an SBCS loan from a non-primary bank are excluded from 
non-treatment observations in estimating equation (3). Similarly, firms that obtained an SBCS loan from 
their primary bank are excluded from the sample in estimating equation (4). The matched observations are 
observations that have the “closest” propensity score to a particular treatment observation and are labeled 
control observations. There are several matching algorithms to find the “closest” control observations. As 
a baseline for our analysis, we employ kernel matching. 
(iii) Finally, we compare the change in the probability of default and in the lending attitude of the primary 
bank, F_PD and R_ATTITUDE, of the treatment group and the control group after the eruption of the 
financial crisis.
27
  
 
 One of the benefits of employing propensity score matching estimation is that we can match 
treatment and control observations using the scalar propensity score. The propensity score, which is the 
conditional probability of being treated given the value of observed characteristics, is a very useful variable in 
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 To be precise, F_PD measures the level of the probability of default after the crisis. However, because we 
control for the probability of default before the crisis by including it as one of the covariates in the first-stage 
probit estimation and the balancing condition explained in equation (6) below ensures that the probability of 
default before the financial crisis is the same on average between the treatment and control groups, we are 
effectively looking at the change in the probability of default. 
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dealing with a highly dimensional vector of covariates. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) showed that treatment 
observations (in our case firms that obtained SBCS loans) and control observations (firms that obtained 
non-SBCS loans) with the same propensity score value have the same distribution of the full vector of 
covariates. It is thus sufficient to match firms in terms of the propensity score in order to obtain the same 
probability distribution of covariates for treatment and control observations. 
 In propensity score matching, an assumption known as unconfoundedness has to be satisfied so that 
the differences in F_PD and R_ATTITUDE between the treated observations and the control observations with 
the same propensity scores are attributable to the treatment effect of SBCS loans (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 
1983). For instance, regarding F_PD,  
 )(|__)_,_( iPR
CT ePRDUMSCPDFPDF X  and  
 )(|__)_,_( iNPR
CT eNPRDUMSCPDFPDF X  (5) 
need to hold (superscripts T and C stand for the treatment group and the control group, respectively). Although 
there is no direct test for unconfoundedness, this assumption means that it is necessary to control for all 
relevant variables Xi that influence the selection of treatment observations and their ex-post probability of 
default (outcome variable). We believe our data is rich enough to include all the necessary covariates.  
In addition to unconfoundedness, the following balancing condition of the covariates given the 
propensity score must be satisfied (Becker and Ichino, 2002):  
 )(|__ iPRii ePRDUMSC XX  and )(|__ iNPRii eNPRDUMSC XX .  (6) 
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In other words, for a given propensity score, treatment observations are randomly chosen and, therefore, the 
treatment sample and the control sample are on average identical. In order to verify the balancing condition (6), 
we implement t-tests for equality of means for each covariate between treated and controls. If there are no 
statistically significant differences between the two groups, then we can proceed to estimate the treatment 
effect in the second step with some confidence. 
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Table 1: Definitions of Variables 
Dependent variables  
 F_ PD Ex-post probability of default: annualized default rate within 3 years estimated 
using Moody’s RiskCalc, based on the financial statement of the firm in year 2009. 
 R_ATTITUDE Index variable indicating the change in lending attitude of a primary bank after 
September 2008: 1: better, 2: unchanged, 3: worse. 
Use of small business credit scoring (SBCS) loans 
 SC_DUM_PR 1 if a firm has SBCS loans outstanding from a primary bank, 0 otherwise. 
 SC_DUM_NPR 1 if a firm has SBCS loans outstanding from a non-primary bank, 0 otherwise. 
Firm characteristics 
 LN_SALES Log of gross annual sales. 
 LN_FIRMAGE Log of firm age. 
 PD Ex-ante probability of default: annualized default rate within 3 years estimated using 
Moody’s RiskCalc, based on the financial statement of the firm during March 2006 
to December 2008. 
 OWNERS_HOLD Share of equity holdings by business representatives. 
 INDUSTRY Borrower industry dummy variable: 1: construction, 2: manufacturing, 3: wholesale 
and retail, 0: other. 
 REGION Borrower dummy variable for region of headquarters: 1: Tokyo metropolitan area, 2: 
Chukyo metropolitan area, 3: Kinki metropolitan area, 0: other. 
Primary bank characteristics 
 BK_LN_ASSETS Log of asset size. 
 BK_SHARE Share of branches within the prefecture of a borrowing firm. 
 HERFINDAHL Herfindahl index computed based on the shares of bank branches within the 
prefecture of a borrower firm, as of October 2007. 
Firm-primary bank relationship 
 R_LN_DURATION Log of the number of years a borrower firm has been transacting with its primary 
bank. 
 R_FREQ Index variable indicating the frequency of meeting between a borrower firm and its 
primary bank: 1: less than annually, 2: annually, 3: semi-annually, 4: once every 2-3 
months, 5: monthly, 6: weekly, 7: daily, 0: no direct meeting. 
 R_DISTANCE Index variable indicating the physical distance between a borrower firm and its 
primary bank’s branch: 1: less than 500m, 2: 500-1,000m, 3: 1-10km, 4: 10-30km, 5: 
30-50km, 6: 50km and more. 
 R_PRIMESHARE Share of loans obtained from the primary bank to a firm’s total loans. 
Note: The dependent variables, F_PD and R_ATTITUDE, measure the ex-post performance of borrowing firms and the change in 
the lending attitude of their primary bank after the global financial crisis erupted. The independent variable 
SC_DUM_PR/SC_DUM_NPR indicates whether a firm has SBCS loans outstanding from a primary/non-primary bank as of 
February 2009. Firm variables are taken from the 2009 RIETI survey and firms’ most recent financial statement, ranging from 
March 2006 to December 2008. BK_LN_ASSETS is as of the end of March 2008, while BK_SHARE and HERFINDAHL are 
calculated from “Nihon-Kinyu-Meikan 2008” (data as of October 2007). Relationship variables are constructed from the 2008 
RIETI survey conducted in February 2008. 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics - SBCS Loan User Firms and Non-user Firms 
This table presents summary statistics of variables used in the OLS estimations (Tables 5 and 6). Definitions of variables are provided in Table 1.  
N Mean SD Min Median Max N Mean SD N Mean SD
Dependent variables
F_PD 581 1.577 1.699 0.130 1.010 10.510 58 2.422 2.254 523 1.483 1.602
R_ATTITUDE 819 2.042 0.429 1.000 2.000 3.000 103 2.175 0.532 716 2.022 0.409
SBCS dummies
SC_DUM_PR 819 0.076 0.265 0.000 0.000 1.000 103 0.602 0.492 716 0.000 0.000
SC_DUM_NPR 819 0.073 0.261 0.000 0.000 1.000 103 0.583 0.496 716 0.000 0.000
Firm characteristics
LN_SALES 819 13.589 1.051 10.104 13.631 15.419 103 13.041 0.994 716 13.668 1.036
LN_FIRMAGE 819 3.505 0.525 1.099 3.638 4.663 103 3.295 0.527 716 3.535 0.519
PD 819 1.542 1.738 0.130 0.920 10.890 103 2.349 2.177 716 1.426 1.634
OWNERS_HOLD 819 0.642 0.350 0.000 0.720 1.000 103 0.719 0.287 716 0.631 0.357
INDUSTRY_1 819 0.286 0.452 0.000 0.000 1.000 103 0.350 0.479 716 0.277 0.448
INDUSTRY_2 819 0.245 0.431 0.000 0.000 1.000 103 0.146 0.354 716 0.260 0.439
INDUSTRY_3 819 0.286 0.452 0.000 0.000 1.000 103 0.311 0.465 716 0.282 0.450
REGION_1 819 0.179 0.384 0.000 0.000 1.000 103 0.272 0.447 716 0.166 0.373
REGION_2 819 0.095 0.294 0.000 0.000 1.000 103 0.058 0.235 716 0.101 0.301
REGION_3 819 0.127 0.333 0.000 0.000 1.000 103 0.107 0.310 716 0.130 0.336
Primary bank characteristics
BK_LN_ASSETS 819 15.252 1.701 10.672 15.117 18.755 103 15.086 1.597 716 15.276 1.716
BK_SHARE 819 0.149 0.121 0.000 0.112 0.462 103 0.158 0.130 716 0.148 0.120
HERFINDAHL 819 0.115 0.067 0.037 0.103 0.292 103 0.122 0.070 716 0.113 0.067
Borrower-primary bank relationship
R_LN_DURATION 819 3.087 0.824 0.000 3.401 4.605 103 2.891 0.824 716 3.115 0.821
R_FREQ 819 5.172 1.185 0.000 5.000 7.000 103 5.155 1.211 716 5.175 1.182
R_DISTANCE 819 2.683 0.898 1.000 3.000 6.000 103 2.728 0.782 716 2.676 0.914
R_PRIMESHARE 819 0.612 0.250 0.000 0.600 1.000 103 0.584 0.230 716 0.616 0.252

Firms without SBCS loansFirms with SBCS loansAll firms
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Table 3: Summary Statistics - Breakdown of SBCS Loan User Firms 
This table presents the means and standard deviations of variables used in the OLS estimations (Tables 5 and 6) for firms that have obtained SBCS loans. Definitions of variables are 
provided in Table 1.  
N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD
Dependent variables
F_PD 35 1.715 1.290 33 2.846 2.749 10 1.348 1.523
R_ATTITUDE 62 2.113 0.483 60 2.267 0.548 19 2.263 0.452
SBCS dummies
SC_DUM_PR 62 1.000 0.000 60 0.317 0.469 19 1.000 0.000
SC_DUM_NPR 62 0.306 0.465 60 1.000 0.000 19 1.000 0.000
Firm characteristics
LN_SALES 62 13.059 0.986 60 13.059 0.958 19 13.158 0.831
LN_FIRMAGE 62 3.304 0.550 60 3.265 0.530 19 3.230 0.609
PD 62 2.391 2.354 60 2.031 1.818 19 1.479 1.519
OWNERS_HOLD 62 0.733 0.283 60 0.690 0.290 19 0.676 0.285
INDUSTRY_1 62 0.371 0.487 60 0.317 0.469 19 0.316 0.478
INDUSTRY_2 62 0.194 0.398 60 0.083 0.279 19 0.105 0.315
INDUSTRY_3 62 0.306 0.465 60 0.317 0.469 19 0.316 0.478
REGION_1 62 0.226 0.422 60 0.317 0.469 19 0.263 0.452
REGION_2 62 0.081 0.275 60 0.033 0.181 19 0.053 0.229
REGION_3 62 0.081 0.275 60 0.150 0.360 19 0.158 0.375
Primary bank characteristics
BK_LN_ASSETS 62 15.036 1.568 60 15.214 1.649 19 15.326 1.676
BK_SHARE 62 0.178 0.137 60 0.139 0.126 19 0.163 0.153
HERFINDAHL 62 0.133 0.069 60 0.117 0.073 19 0.140 0.078
Borrower-primary bank relationship
R_LN_DURATION 62 2.954 0.804 60 2.787 0.878 19 2.766 0.951
R_FREQ 62 5.226 1.122 60 5.133 1.228 19 5.316 0.946
R_DISTANCE 62 2.774 0.876 60 2.700 0.671 19 2.789 0.787
R_PRIMESHARE 62 0.630 0.228 60 0.515 0.200 19 0.515 0.165
SBCS loans from primary banks
(S_DUM_PR =1)
SBCS loans from non-primary banks
(S_DUM_NPR =1)
SBCS loans from both primary and
non-primary banks
(S_DUM_PR =1 & S_DUM_NPR =1)
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Table 4: Measures of Firms’ Relationship with Primary and Non-primary Banks 
This table compares the means of firm-bank relationship variables for primary banks and non-primary banks. Non-primary bank here refers to firms’ second-primary bank (the bank 
accounting for the second-largest amount of a firm’s loans outstanding). DURATION indicates the number of years a borrower firm has been transacting with a bank; FREQ is an 
index variable indicating the frequency of meeting between a borrower firm and a bank and takes a value from 0 to 7, with a larger value representing more frequent meetings; 
DISTANCE is an index variable indicating the physical distance between a borrower firm and a bank’s branch and takes a value from 1 to 6, with a larger value representing a larger 
distance: LOANSHARE refers to a bank’s share in a firm’s total loans outstanding. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
Variables
N Mean (a) SD N Mean (b) SD (a)-(b) t-stat
Borrower-bank relationship
DURATION 819 28.287 16.908 700 20.501 15.498 7.786 *** 13.350
FREQ 819 5.172 1.185 733 4.244 1.655 0.928 *** 16.081
DISTANCE 819 2.683 0.898 737 3.006 1.138 -0.323 *** -7.913
LOANSHARE 819 0.612 0.250 696 0.227 0.138 0.385 *** 31.783
With a primary bank With a non-primary bank Mean Difference: (a)-(b)
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Table 5: OLS Estimation Results for Ex-Post Performance of Firms and Lending Attitude of the Primary Bank 
This table presents the OLS estimation results for F_PD (ex-post probability of default) and R_ATTITUDE (lending attitude of the primary bank). Definitions of the variables are 
provided in Table 1. ***, **, * indicate a significance level of 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. 
Dep. variable: F_PD Dep. variable: R_ATTITUDE
Estimation method: OLS Estimation method: OLS
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t Coef. Std. Err. t P>t
SBCS dummies
SC_DUM_PR -0.459 ** 0.223 -2.060 0.040 -0.028 0.057 -0.490 0.626
SC_DUM_NPR 0.816 *** 0.233 3.500 0.000 0.211 *** 0.059 3.610 0.000
Firm characteristics
LN_SALES -0.133 ** 0.062 -2.150 0.032 0.018 0.017 1.030 0.305
LN_FIRMAGE -0.004 0.128 -0.030 0.973 0.023 0.035 0.670 0.506
PD 0.719 *** 0.037 19.600 0.000 0.068 *** 0.009 7.460 0.000
OWNERS_HOLD 0.179 0.155 1.160 0.249 0.051 0.044 1.150 0.251
INDUSTRY_1 0.121 0.166 0.730 0.465 0.022 0.045 0.500 0.619
INDUSTRY_2 0.227 0.167 1.360 0.176 0.109 ** 0.046 2.340 0.019
INDUSTRY_3 0.031 0.164 0.190 0.849 -0.009 0.044 -0.200 0.844
REGION_1 -0.102 0.180 -0.560 0.573 0.093 * 0.050 1.880 0.061
REGION_2 0.079 0.199 0.400 0.691 0.093 * 0.054 1.720 0.086
REGION_3 -0.050 0.173 -0.290 0.773 0.075 0.049 1.520 0.128
Primary bank characteristics
BK_LN_ASSETS -0.002 0.038 -0.060 0.955 -0.004 0.011 -0.350 0.723
BK_SHARE 0.929 0.605 1.540 0.125 -0.033 0.171 -0.190 0.846
HERFINDAHL -2.257 * 1.209 -1.870 0.062 0.150 0.337 0.440 0.657
Borrower-primary bank relationship
R_LN_DURATION -0.076 0.084 -0.910 0.363 -0.037 * 0.022 -1.660 0.098
R_FREQ 0.079 * 0.045 1.770 0.078 -0.022 * 0.013 -1.690 0.091
R_DISTANCE 0.108 * 0.059 1.830 0.068 -0.004 0.017 -0.240 0.811
R_PRIMESHARE 0.060 0.212 0.280 0.778 -0.114 * 0.060 -1.910 0.056
Constant 1.840 * 0.990 1.860 0.064 1.857 *** 0.274 6.780 0.000
Number of observations 581 819
Adj.-R
2 0.487 0.094
Prob. > F 0.000 0.000
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Table 6: Probit Estimation Results for the Determinants of SBCS loans 
This table presents the probit estimation results for S_DUM_PR (SBCS loans from a primary bank) and S_DUM_NPR (SBCS loans from a non-primary bank). Definitions of the 
variables are provided in Table 1. ***, **, * indicate a significance level of 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. 
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z Coef. Std. Err. z P>z
Firm characteristics
LN_SALES -0.219 *** 0.084 -2.610 0.009 -0.311 *** 0.089 -3.480 0.001
LN_FIRMAGE -0.292 * 0.166 -1.760 0.078 -0.292 * 0.167 -1.750 0.081
PD 0.091 ** 0.037 2.490 0.013 0.082 ** 0.040 2.030 0.043
OWNERS_HOLD 0.265 0.229 1.160 0.246 0.066 0.239 0.280 0.782
INDUSTRY_1 0.228 0.226 1.010 0.313 -0.159 0.208 -0.760 0.446
INDUSTRY_2 0.235 0.247 0.950 0.342 -0.520 * 0.269 -1.930 0.053
INDUSTRY_3 0.308 0.230 1.340 0.180 -0.051 0.204 -0.250 0.803
REGION_1 0.707 *** 0.241 2.940 0.003 0.781 *** 0.240 3.260 0.001
REGION_2 0.122 0.280 0.440 0.663 -0.064 0.367 -0.170 0.862
REGION_3 0.103 0.260 0.400 0.693 0.573 ** 0.243 2.350 0.019
Primary bank characteristics
BK_LN_ASSETS 0.013 0.056 0.240 0.812 0.020 0.054 0.370 0.708
BK_SHARE 0.917 0.840 1.090 0.275 -0.483 0.861 -0.560 0.575
HERFINDAHL 2.354 1.678 1.400 0.161 2.597 1.691 1.540 0.125
Borrower-primary bank relationship
R_LN_DURATION -0.018 0.115 -0.160 0.873 -0.027 0.110 -0.240 0.807
R_FREQ 0.091 0.066 1.380 0.167 0.100 0.067 1.490 0.136
R_DISTANCE 0.137 * 0.083 1.660 0.098 0.106 0.089 1.190 0.235
R_PRIMESHARE -0.209 0.291 -0.720 0.473 -1.112 *** 0.312 -3.560 0.000
Constant 0.510 1.366 0.370 0.709 2.810 ** 1.378 2.040 0.041
Number of observations 785 782
Log likelihood -193.8 -177.6
Pseudo R
2 0.1162 0.1612
Dep. variable: S_DUM_PR
Estimation method: Probit
Dep. variable: S_DUM_NPR
Estimation method: Probit
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Table 7: Treatment Effect Estimations for Ex-Post Performance of Firms and Lending Attitude of the Primary Bank 
This table presents the estimation results for the treatment effects for F_PD (ex-post probability of default) and R_ATTITUDE (lending attitude of the primary bank) of SBCS loan 
users. Definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1. ***, **, * indicate a significance level of 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. 
[Primary Bank]
Variable Treated Controls Difference S.E. t-stat.
F_PD Unmatched 1.715 1.483 0.232 0.277 0.84
ATT 1.715 1.981 -0.266 0.236 -1.13
R_ATTITUDE Unmatched 2.113 2.022 0.091 * 0.055 1.65
ATT 2.113 2.077 0.036 0.065 0.56
[Non-primary Bank]
Variable Treated Controls Difference S.E. t-stat.
F_PD Unmatched 2.846 1.483 1.363 *** 0.303 4.50
ATT 2.846 1.801 1.045 ** 0.490 2.13
R_ATTITUDE Unmatched 2.267 2.022 0.244 *** 0.057 4.31
ATT 2.267 2.055 0.211 *** 0.075 2.83
 
 
 
